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ABSTRACT
A Fault Detection and isolation (FDI) algorithm design is presented using the
Multiple Model algorithm technique for the Bluebird aircraft being developed at
the Naval Postgraduate School. The requirement to maintain high performance in
the dynamic system of the aircraft necessitates the use of FDI techniques to detect
and isolate malfunctions in the sensors and actuators of the aircraft without using
hardware redundancy. The solution presented makes use of analytical redundancy in
a bank of Kalman filters. Statistical tests using Bayesian theory are applied on the
filter's innovations to perform the task of detection and isolation. The algorithm was
developed using MATLAB software from The Math Works. Inc. The work presented
in this thesis is related only to the task of FDI. The remaining task of the monitoring
system, reconfiguration and continued operation by the observed plant after a failure
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I. INTRODUCTION TO FAULT DETECTION
AND ISOLATION
The field of Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) has evolved as a result of ef-
forts to produce better control algorithms for dynamic systems. Continually higher
standards of performance, reliability and survivability dictate the development of
new control techniques to achieve certain hardware goals. Hardware performance
goals can be related to lowering noise, eliminating biases and meeting bandwidth
specifications for sensors actuators and other mechanical components. Reliability
specifications are evolving and form the basis for determining the minimum hardware
and software complement to deal with performance requirements. An example of a
reliability specification is that which applies to aircraft and dictates the probability
of catastrophic failure to be at 10- or better for civilian aircraft or at 10-1 to 10-5
for military applications [Ref. 1, p.1-1]. The survivability criterion applies more to
military applications where the continuation of a mission is important after the sys-
tem has been partly damaged. FDI techniques can be applied to the design of Flight
Guidance and Control Systems to increase their reliability, lower the cost associated
with hardware redundancy, and improve aircraft survivability by allowing more dis-
persion of components [Ref. 1]. The main task of failure detection and compensation
is to modify the normal mode configuration in order to include the capability of de-
tecting abnormal changes and compensating for them by activating back-up systems,
adjusting feedback gains, or taking other correction measures. The primary func-
tion of the FDI algorithm itself is to register an alarm when an abnormal condition
develops in a monitored system and to identify the component at the source of the
problem. The failure detection and isolation system should provide the capability
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to detect the occurrence of failures in a given system and isolate the faulty sensors
or hardware. all in the presence of noise and errors in the model. The basis for the
decision in the event of a fault is the fault signature. in other words. a signal that is
obtained from some kind of faulty system model defining the effects associated with
a fault. The difficulty associated with the design of FDI systems lies in maintaining
their ability to detect small failures, while avoiding false alarms in the presence of
noise and erroneous models which cause effects similar to the failures signatures.
A. SUBDIVISIONS OF FDI
FDI systems are concerned with determining the details of a particular failure
such as its type, its source, its location and its size.
1. Type and Size of Failure
The type of a failure can be divided into two parts:
* Abrupt or hard faults.
* Soft or incipient faults.
An abrupt fault can also be described as hard or catastrophic, and results in drastic
changes in the model. On the other hand, an incipient or soft failure is characterized
by a slowly developing and time varying perturbation in the system.
2. Sources of Failure
The sources of failures in Flight Control Systems are usually described by
actuator or sensor failures. A failed sensor can be detected by hardware redundancy.
This method is implemented by using several sensors to measure the same signal.
The outputs can be compared in a voting scheme in order to detect significant differ-
ences between the repeated sensors and isolate a faulty sensor. This FDI method can
become very costly for aircraft using hundreds of sensors, and this hardware multipli-
cation can also significantly increase the overall weight of the aircraft. The additional
2
space required to accommodate the equipment also becomes a major concern in the
already limited and crowded environment inside an aircraft. The use of hardware
redundancy to detect erroneous actuators or system failures is usually not practical
because the replication of components other than sensors is not feasible [Ref. 2]. The
problems associated with hardware redundancy motivated the introduction of the
concept of analytical redundancy in FDI. In regards to present aircraft, the onboard
use of highly efficient computers capable of mathematically intensive calculations.
now renders possible the use of algorithms to perform the task of FDI. The analvti-
cal redundancy approach uses the system model instead of hardware redundancy to
detect and isolate failures in the observed system.
3. Location of Failures
The term location, identification or isolation are often used interchangeably
in FDI when determining which sensor or actuator is at fault. The level of coupling
in the system is a criteria to consider when classifying the isolation problem. For
example, jet engine and flight control systems involve plants with strong coupling.
Their subsystems are also strongly coupled, and because of this, usually not all the
state variables are being measured. To achieve the isolation process for these systems
use of analytical redundancy is necessary [Ref. 2].
B. FDI VERSUS BUILT IN TEST TECHNIQUE
FDI techniques differ from other error detection schemes implemented by means
of Built-in Test Equipments (usually called BITE's). BITE are usually designed to
test for hardware malfunction using hardware or software methods such as:
"* CPU tests to check the instruction repertory.
"* Parity control on data and address buses.
"* Wrap around circuitries used to test two way interfaces and mainly useful at
system level for integration purposes.
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"* Power sensing circuitries to detect when the applied power goes out of the
expected range.
"* RAM tests through write-then-read cycles performed on all the memory loca-
tions and with particular patterns.
"* ROM tests performed by checking the run time computed checksums against
prestored ones.
"* Wrap around tests that require data management.
"* Special-to-project logic checks that control the global development of the system
versus time. [Ref. 3, 4]
These tests are implemented in self-monitored systems and run in external self-
contained units. BITE's often make use of the concept of graceful degradation when
the loss of redundancy would result in a penalization that would be considered too
high. For some failures, specified degraded modes of operation are better suited. This
approach is generally dealt with by specifying for each important function a nominal
operation and a reduced level of operation. The BITE approach is more limited than
the FDI using analytical redundancy in that it can only monitor the systems or signals
that are physically measurable. An FDI algorithm on the other hand can monitor a
wider array of parameters. Even though the sensors in a given system are dissimilar
they are all driven by the same dynamic states and are therefore functionally related.
This is what is referred to as analytical redundancy, inherent redundancy, or func-
tional redundancy, as opposed to hardware redundancy. The work presented in this
thesis will be oriented towards the development of an FDI algorithm using analytical
redundancy.
C. FDI ALGORITHM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Many criteria are used to evaluate the performance of an FDI algorithm but
the most prominent are:
e Rapidity of detection.
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* Sensitivity to slowly developing faults.
* False alarm rate.
* Missed failure detection.
* Incorrect fault isolation. [Ref. 5. p. 7]
1. Failure Simulation
The standard method for testing the performance of an FDI scheme is to
simulate a fault, maintain it, and look at the reaction of the algorithm. The faults
of a dynamic system can be simulated in various ways. For example. a sensor fault
on a recorded signal can be reproduced by adding noise or multiplying the signal
by a constant, and the behavior of the fault detection device can then be observed.
This method can be repeated to test and improve the FDI algorithm. More details
are presented in a later chapter to show how the failures were simulated for the FDI
algorithm presented in this thesis. It should be mentioned that the technique of
emulating faults on one signal creates little or no effect on the other signals. This
situation could differ significantly from what could happen in a feedback process
subjected to some failure. In this case one fault would often affect several other
signals.
2. Rapidity of Detection
The output of the detection system should either indicate that a particular
system has failed or give no response if the system is still serviceable. The rapidity
of detection plays a role depending on the purpose of the FDI implementation. In
aircraft applications, the rapidity of detection is instrumental in ensuring the success
of the mission, especially on the vital control sensor of jet aircraft equipped with
stability augmentation systems. However, if the FDI algorithm is to be employed
in a system for preventive maintenance purpose, the algorithm should be tuned to
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detect slowly developing faults in the form of biases or noise at the expense of speed
of detection.
3. False Alarm
False alarm occurs when an error is detected while the system is still oper-
ating properly. False alarms are indicative of a poor FDI algorithm. Effort should be
made during the design of the algorithm to minimize the occurence of false alarms as
they lead to lack of confidence in the system. Unfortunately the minimization of the
false alarm rate is often done at the expense of detecting small errors. A trade-off
between these two criteria must be made. To address this issue, the question of how
important an undetected failure would affect the system must be answered. Some-
times the seriousness of the fault is such that it is better to respond to a false alarm by
changing the suspected component and retesting it later than leaving it in operation.
This discussion leads to the choice of thresholds in the algorithm. Clark and Walker
present two interesting approaches to solve the threshold determination problem by
presenting adaptive threshold selection methods in chapters 2 and 14 of [Ref. 5].
4. Incorrect Fault Isolation
False identification of the failure source is another effect to be minimized in
the design of the algorithm. An erroneous identification of a correctly detected fault
causes the reconfiguration system to compensate for the wrong sensor or actuator
and can lead to multiple other failures.
D. ROBUSTNESS OF FDI ALGORITHM
The performance criterion of the FDI algorithm leads to the concept of robust-
ness. Robustness of the algorithm is a measure of how the performance can remain
unaffected by variation in parameters unaccounted for in the design or by conditions
in the operating system that vary differently than what was assumed during the
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modeling.
The primary sources of divergence from modeled deterministic systems are noise
and uncertainties in the physical parameters of the operating plant. Most of the signal
processing techniques used in the field of FDI treat the problem of noise by assuming
that contributions have random fluctuations that follow stationary Gaussian process.
If the actual system has disturbances and noise that are non-stationary andor non-
Gaussian than the FDI algorithm performance will be degraded. Nonlinear models
can also contribute to the inaccuracy of the model. In particular. when the parameters
of the model are derived from a linearization process around some nominal conditions.
The majority of the FDI techniques are based on state estimation methods common
to linear systems theory. If the parameters of the model are known with precision.
the state estimates representing the modeled plant will be accurate, the FDI scheme
will be sensitive to incipient faults and the false alarm rate will be kept to a minimum
[Ref. 5, p. 10].
Robustness with respect to the type of fault should also be considered in the
design, since any given components can malfunction in many different ways. Sensors
can experience biases, change of scale factor, wear and tear, friction, variation with
hot or cold temperature, etc. All these symptoms can cause any given component to
fail in a different pattern. If the FDI algorithm is set to detect and identify only a few
of the many types of faults for any sensor this will lib ýt its performance. Therefore,
the FDI scheme should be built on taking the widest repertoire of fault signatures and
should also be capable of accommodating any new types of failures as they develop.
E. PROGRESS IN FDI
Perhaps one of the most cited reference in FDI is the paper published by Will-
sky in 1976 [Ref. 6]. In his paper Willsky provides an overview of a number of the
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basic concepts in failure detection. In particular, he concentrates on linear svstems
and compares the design of voting schemes, specific failure-sensitive filters, multiple
hypothesis filter detectors, statistical tests on filter innovations and development of
jump process formulations. Since 1976. several other survey papers have been pub-
lished in the field of FDI [Ref. 7, 8, 9]. New approaches have been presented using
geometrical interpretation of the concept of analytical redundancy. These approaches
were developed for determining robust parity relations for failure detection in dynamic
systems. The differences in the recently introduced methods are that the problems
of model uncertainties are now addressed in detail. [Ref. 10, 2]. To respond to the
same problem of model uncertainties, many authors have worked with and developed
the theory of Unknown Input Observers(UIO) for use in linear uncertain dynamical
systems [Ref. 11, 5]. The last two methods mentioned are part of what is referred
to as the model-based approach to FDI. Some progress has also been reported using
neural networks or the knowledge based approach. Recent research directions include
use of techniques such as fuzzy logic, adaptive threshold selector and 7-X, observers
[Ref. 12].
F. FDI APPLICATION
The FDI algorithm developed in this thesis uses the six degree of freedom model
derived for the Bluebird test aircraft by Capt Kuechenmeister USMC [Ref. 13]. The
non-linear model can be linearized around typical flight conditions. The Bluebird
aircraft is used at the Naval Postgraduate School to test guidance, navigation and
control systems in horizontal flight. The physical characteristics of the Bluebird are
given in table 2.3 in [Ref. 13, p. 8]. In an aircraft flight control system the actuators
are used as servomechanisms which drive the control surfaces and the engine. The
actuators receive their input signals from an onboard Flight Management Computer.
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The instrumentation of the Bluebird aircraft includes manv sensors or transducers
attached to the airframe, which provide signals proportional to the motion of the air-
plane, such as airspeed, altitude, heading, accelerations, attitude and rates of change
of attitude, control surface deflections. engine thrust etc.
1. FDI on the Bluebird Aircraft
The four different actuators under test in the Bluebird model correspond





The sensors include the following parameters in the Bluebird model:
"* u for the forward velocity.
"* v for the lateral velocity.
"* w for the vertical velocity.
"* p for the roll rate.
"* q for the pitch rate.
"* r for the yaw rate.
"* - (phi) for the Euler roll angle.
"* E (theta) for the Euler angle of attack.
" %Y (psi) for the Euler heading angle.
The FDI algorithm implemented uses the Bluebird aircraft model and the
multiple model FDI technique described in [Ref. 7] and [Ref. 14]. The equations and
explanation on how this algorithm works are presented in Chapter II.
The work presented in this thesis is related to the Fault Detection or Fault
Isolation task (FDI). Reconfiguration or the remaining task of the monitoring system
to reconfigure and permit continued operation by the observed plant after a fault has
been detected and isolated is not addressed.
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II. IMPLEMENTATION OF MULTIPLE
MODEL TECHNIQUE FOR FDI
A. DESCRIPTION ON THE MULTIPLE MODEL TECHNIQUE
The multiple model method addresses the problem of FDI by observing a se-
quence of inputs and outputs from a system and then choosing one out of a given set
of possible models that is felt most likely to have responded in an observed fashion.
This broad definition for multiple model technique does not only apply to FDI prob-
lem but also to areas of system identification and adaptive control which prompted
the early development of this method [Ref. 151.
The approach to FDI using multiple model technique is achieved as follows:
the fault isolation is carried out on the basis of different fault hypothesis and a
separate estimator(observer or Kalman filter) is assigned for a finite number of fault
hypotheses. These hypotheses are then tested in terms of likelihood functions, using
Bayesian decision theory, to detect which fault is present. The algorithm presented
in this thesis makes use of a bank of 14 Kalman filters which represent each of the
different error hypotheses tested. The first hypothesis is in the case of no failure. The
remaining filters are tuned for hard failure in the four actuators and nine sensors.
Figure 2.1 represent the flow diagram for the multiple model FDI algorithm.
B. STATE EQUATIONS OF THE AIRCRAFT
The states of the observed plant can be represented by a set of linearized stochas-
tic equations in the time domain. In the following equation the input is represented
by u, the output vector by y and the states of the system by the vector x. All other
effects that obscure the fault detection are introduced in the vectors w and v and
10
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Figure 2.1: FDI Flow Diagram using Multiple Model Algorithm
include parameters such as noise or unknown inputs:
k(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) + Ww(t) (2.1)
y(t) = Cx(t) + Vv(t) (2.2)
In the Bluebird application, x E V, u E VZ4 and y E V9. The matrices A, B, C are
known and of compatible dimensions.
1. State-Space Representation of Sampled and Discrete Systems
The solution to equation 2.1 has the following form:
x(t) = 4§i(t, to) x(to) + 1, •(t, r) B u(T) dr + il i(t, r) W w(7) dT (2.3)
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If the system is sampled with sampling interval T. then we are interested
in the values of the state x at discrete time intervals. Using equation 2.3. the value
of the state's vector x, at time t = (k + I)T given its value at t, = kT can be obtained
as follows:
,(k+1)T
x((k+ I)T) = 4[(k+ I)T. kT]x(kT) + P((k + I)T.r)B u(7)dr +
fk(+)T 4b((k + 1 )T, T-) W Wo(7) (17 (2.4)
If u(.) and w(.) are piecewise constant between sampling intervals. that is.
u(t) = u(kT) for kT<t< (k+ 1)T
and
w(t) = w(kT) for kT<t <(k+ I)T
then u and w can be taken out of the integral in equation 2.4 to obtain the sampled
or discrete state-space representation
x((k+l)T) = 'Z[(k+l)T, kT]x(kT)+fA[(k+l)T, kT]u(kT)+]F[(k+I)T, kT]w(kT),
(2.5)
where
$[(k + 1)T, kT] = fk+I) exp{A[(k + 1)T,T]} dr (2.6)
is the state transition matrix in the discrete form and
A[(k + 1)T, kT] = J P[(k + 1)T.r]Bdr (2.7)
A[(k
r[(k + 1)T, kT] = (+l)T f[(k + I)T. 7]W dT (2.8)
A discrete measurement y is given by
y(kT) = C(kT)x(kT) + V(kT)v(kT) (2.9)
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If the system is not a sampled continuous system, then T caij be ignored and set to
one [Ref. 16, p. 215]. The solution to the difference equation 2.5 can be obtained by
letting k take on values k = 0. 1,2,3...... V and collecting terms to get the solution
of the discrete-time equation over kT samples:
k-1 k-I
x(kT) = 4(T) x(O) + 1 ,I0k-J-'(T) A(T) u(jT) + E k- --I(T) F(T) ,(jT) (2.10)j=O )=0
The format used in the rest of the document as well as in the code of
the FDI algorithm will utilize the nomenclature employed in [Ref. 17] which is a
simplification of the equations derived above. The following eqnations represent the
state and measurement equations of a linear plant using this simplified format. Notice
that the vectors are represented by using bold characters. In the Bluebird application.
the C matrix will be set to be identity since all measurements are equal to tile state
of the plant:
x(k+1) = (k+1,k)x(k) + A(k+1,k)u(k) +L(k+I,k)w(k) (2.11)
y(k) = C(k)x(k) + V(k) v(k) (2.12)
C. KALMAN FILTER EQUATIONS
The following reasons prompted the use of Kalman filters to detect failures.
First the algorithm of the Kalman filter allows the calculation of the gain matrix in
order to minimize the variance of the estimation error. This feature of optimization
will be beneficial if the same estimates obtained from the FDI algorithm are to be used
later on in the aircraft autopilot. Another advantage of using an estimation algorithm
is that in the absence of hardware redundancy it is still possible to use a degraded
instrument through the information provided by the estimator in the reconfiguration
mode. However, the main reason for using Kalman filters is that the covariance of
the residual or innovation process calculated in order to determine the Kalman gains
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are also utilized in the detection calculation using Bayesian theory. [-his feature of
the detection algorithm will be covered in more detail in section D.
The equations developed in the following sections are implemented in the MATLAB
code listed in APPENDIX C.
1. Assumptions and Initial Values
a. Yoise Assumptions
With the plant equations given by 2.11 and 2.12. the following as-
sumptions are made: The measurement noise has zero mean,
E[v(k)] = 0, fork =0.1.2.... (2.13)
is uncorrelated.
E [v(k)v T (j)] = E [v(j)v T (k)] = 0. forj 7 k (2.14)
and has covariance
E[v(k)v T (k)] = R(k), for k = 0,1,2,... (2.15)
Equations 2.14 and 2.15 can also be expressed with the Kroneker delta as
E [v(k)v T(j)] = R(k)6k0 (2.16)
where
60 1 = 0, k~j (2.17)
The random process noise has zero mean
E(w(k)] = 0, for k =0,1,2.... (2.18)
is uncorrelated, and has covariance
E[w(k)w T (j)] = E[w(j)wT (k)] = Q(k)6kj (2.19)
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The random process noise and the measurement noise are uncorrelated
E[w(k)vT(j)] = E[v(j)wT (k)] = 0, for k.j =O.1,2.... (2.20)
b. Initial States Assumptions
The input u(k) for k = 0. 12.,... is known and deterministic.
The initial state is a random variable with known mean
E[x(0)] (2.21)
and covariance
E I [x(0) - Ro-][x(0) - Roor}= M (2.22)
the measurement noise and initial states are uncorrelated:
E [x(O) vT(k)] = E [v(k) xT(O)] = 0. for k = 0, 1,2.... (2.23)
The random process noise and initial state values are uncorrelated as well:
E [w(k)xT(O)] = E [x(O)wT(k)) = 0, for k = 0, 1,2,... (2.24)
2. Discrete Kalman Filter Equations
The observer equation is given by
5c(k/k) = k(k/k - 1) + G(k) [y(k) - S(k)] (2.25)
where
k(k) = C:R(k/k- 1) (2.26)
The nomenclature i(k/k - 1) means estimate of x at time or observation k given
measurements at time up to and including (k - 1). The goal of the optimal estimator
is to minimize the estimation error defined as
e(k/k) dLe' k(k/k) - x(k) (2.27)
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A zero mean estimation error is sought for all k to obtain an unbiased estimator.
The complete development of the gain, covariance. and update matrices in order to
achieve the minimization of the variance of the measurement errors can be found in
[Ref. 17, p.4 - 3 2 to 4-41]. The following equations summarize the different parameters
involved in the calculations inside the Kalman filter. The computational steps involve
calculations before use of the Kalman filter as well as generation of estimates during
the filter operation. The gain schedule can be evaluated prior to using the estimator
since the gains do not depend on the measurement data sequence [Ref. 17. p4-421.
The following calculations are used to compute the gains and are imple-
mented in the MATLAB file kalmn\_gain.m found in APPENDIX C.
First, let k = 0 and set the initial value for the covariance matrix P(k/k -
1) = M and then calculate the gain schedule with
G(k) = P(k/k -1) CT(k) [C(k)P(k/k - 1)CT(k) + R(k)]- (2.28)
The term in the bracket of equation 2.28 represents the hypothesized filter's internally
computed residual covariance or the innovation covariance. This term will become
important in section D. and is denoted as
ai(k) = C(k)P(k/k - 1)CT(k) + R(k) (2.29)
Next, compute the covariance of the estimation error matrix
P(k/k) = [I - G(k)C(k)]P(k/k- 1) (2.30)
Now, compute the predicted value for P(k + 1/k) using the discrete Riccati equation:
P(k+l/k) = $(k+l,k)P(k/k)'ý T (k+l,k) + r(k+l.k)Q(k)r(k+l.k) (2.31)
Repeat equation 2.28, 2.30 and 2.31 recursively until the final observation value
for k is reached. Hopefully, k should be large enough so that the gains will have
16
reached steady-state values. Notice that the last value calculated for P(k + I/k)
becomes P(k/k - 1) when the values are brought up again at the beginning of this
computation loop.
After the gain schedule has been computed. the values are stored in memory
and the observer can be implemented. The next equations are required to build the
Kalman filter. Once again these equations can be evaluated on a digital computer.
The MATLAB code for the Bluebird application can be found at APPENDIX C in
file kalman.i.m. First, k is set to zero and k(O/ - 1) is initialized to 3-,. After this.
k(k/k) can be evaluated when the first observation y(k) becomes available with
k(k/k) = k(k/k-1) + G(k)[y(k) - C(k)k(k/k- 1)] (2.32)
The term in the bracket of equation 2.32 is referred to as the innovation process or
the residual and is represented by
ri(k) = y(k) - 1(k/k - 1) (2.33)
The predicted value for k(k + I/k) is then evaluated with
*(k + I/k) = ,•(k + 1, k) k(k/k) + A(k + 1, k) u(k) (2.34)
Equations 2.32 and 2.34 are also repeated recursively to generate the state estimates.
As in the previous procedure, the last value calculated for k(k+ I/k) becomes k(k/k-
1) when the loop is reentered.
The updated measurement estimates are also calculated in the above steps
in equation 2.32 since
Sr(k) = C(k)k(k/k- 1) (2.35)
D. PROBABILITY OF FAILURE USING BAYESIAN THEORY
As explained earlier, the Multiple Model algorithm makes use of Bayesian theory
to perform the task of detection and isolation. The Multiple Model technique involves
17
the design of a finite set of linear stochastic systems indexed by I = 1,2 ...... V with
the ith model being the one that corresponds to the actual model being observed.
This leads to the standard multiple hypothesis testing problem. Suppose that Hi
denotes the hypothesis that the real system corresponds to the tI" model. and pi(O)
the a-priori probability that Hi is true, then similarly pi(k) can denote the probability
that Hi is true for all the measurements up to and including the k"h observation. The
previous measurements can be represented by the set Alk = {u(O), u(1),. . , u(k -
1), y(l), y( 2 ),.... y(k - 1)}. The Bayes' rule gives the following formula to calculate
pi (k),
p,(k) - p( y(k)IIHi, MAk ) pi(k - 1)Eiý=ipA y (k) Inj, ,M~k ) pj (k-I
where p(.) is the conditional probability density function. The density functions
must be calculated at each observation. This density function is conditioned on Hi
and is fortunately the same one step prediction density function produced by the
ith Kalman filter. This term is represented by ai in 2.29. Under hypothesis Hi,
the residual ri(k) should have a mean of zero, a covariance of ai(k) and be normally
distributed. Moreover, y(k) conditioned on Hi and Mk should be Gaussian with mean
Ci(k) 3FZ(k/k - 1) and with covariance ai(k). [Ref. 7, p. 2-2] These assumptions lead
to the following important formula for the probability density function
p( y(k)H1,Mk) = exP{-½rT(k)a-'(k)ri(k)} (2.37)p(yk~~,Mk)=(2r)22[det ai(k)]! 2
where m is the dimension of y(k).
Equations 2.32, 2.33, 2.34, 2.36 and 2.37 represent the Multiple Model
algorithm.
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III. ADJUSTMENTS TO THE MULTIPLE
MODEL ALGORITHM
A. MODEL SELECTION FOR EACH FILTER
As mentioned in Chapter II. , section A., the Multiple Model algorithm is
implemented using a bank of Kalman filters. Each Kalman filter is based or -tuned"
for one possible error scenario. The inputs to the filters are the measurements of the
different aircraft sensors and the outputs are the innovation sequences ri(k), which are
a measure of how close the estimates are to the true measurements. These residuals
should be white sequences for the filter tracking the correct model. If the filter's model
is not correct, then the residuals will not be white and will include errors due to the
fact that the estimates are based on incorrect models. The probability calculations
equation 2.36 give a measure of which model, based on a specific fault, is most likely
to be correct compared to other models.
1. Fault Modeling for the Filters and for the Simulation Runs
Each Kalman filter is based on a particular failure; several methods can be
used to change the nominal model, i.e., the model representing no failure, to one that
is modified to isolate a specific fault.
a. Actuator Failure
Typically, actuator malfunction can be modeled by setting one of the
columns of the B matrix "o zero for the respective actuator to be at fault. Another
way is to increase the covariance of w(k) over the normal range of operation. A
third way, equivalent to the previous two, would be to add a driving term g(k) in
equation 2.34, [Ref. 8, p.461]. The algorithm developed in this thesis will utilize
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the first two schemes to simulate faults and only the zeroing scheme to set the model
used by each Kalman filter. This is done in order to keep the number of Kahnan
filter to a minimum. Work by Menke and Maybeck has also indicated that soft
failure can be detected by Kalman filters tuned with hard failure models [Ref. 14,
p. 3136]. Therefore, the method employed in this thesis will use the first modeling
scenario where the columns of the B matrix are set to zero to tune the Kalman filters.
However, during the simulation, the appropriate column of the system's B matrix fed
into all the different Kalman filters will only be set to zero for simulation of hard
actuator failure. Incipient actuator failure simulation will be done by changing the
covariance of the process noise for the system's model. In other words, Kalman filters
based on the models with B matrice's column set to zero will be expected to detect
both hard and soft failure for the one specific actuator.
b. Sensor Failure
Sensor failures can also be modeled in three ways. The methods are
the same as for the three schemes explained above for the actuators except that
the zeros are included in the respective sensor's column of the C matrices and the
measurement noise v(k) is varied instead of the process noise.
B. TUNING OF THE KALMAN FILTERS
After selecting the models for the design of each filter, it is important to set the
parameters of every Kalman filter so that the process of detection will be optimized
to prevent the occurrence of false alarms. The Kalman filter is said to be tuned if it
provides an optimal or minimal error covariance on the estimates of the states.
The performance of the filter can be evaluated and adjusted by a series of
statistical tests. The operation of the estimator in equation 2.32 can be simplified
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by the following representation
Rn,, = X~od + G [residualsnew] (3.1)
From equation 3.1, it is easy to see that the new estimates are formed partly using
the old estimates, which are a function of the plant model, and also from the new
measurements residuals. As one can see, the value of the new estimates is also a
function of the Kalman gains. For small G's, the new estimates use the model and
for large gains, the new estimates will be influenced by the measurements. The choice
and derivation of the gains is therefore instrumental in the operation of the Kalman
filters.
1. Influence of the Kalman Filter's Gains
As can be seen in equation 2.28, the gains are influenced by two variables,
P(k/k - 1) and R(k). Thus, there are four ways to influence the estimates. First
P(k/k - 1) are small and R(k) are fixed which gives small gains and is in agreement
with the model behavior since small P(k/k - 1) means that the model is adequate
(small variances on the errors). Second, R(k) are large and P(k/k - 1) are fixed,
which leads to small gains and also means that the model should be believed since
the measurements are noisy. Now for the case where the gains are large. If the
P(k/k - 1) is large and R(k) is fixed then the model is inadequate and the new
measurements should be used. If R(k) is small and P(k/k - 1) is fixed, then it means
that the measurements are good.
A Kalman filter does not operate correctly if the gains becomes small before
they should, meaning that the filter thinks that the new measurements do not carry
valuable information when this is actually not the case. The filter is said to diverge
when this occurs. To avoid filter divergence a series of tests must be performed.
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2. Tests on the Kalman Filter
As a first check for the operation of the Kalman filter, the innovations
should form zero-mean and white sequences (see proof in [Ref. IS]). Formulae can be
found in [Ref. 16, p.95-97] to evaluate the mean with test statistics and to perform
whiteness tests on the covariance of the residuals. These tests can also be performed
in MATLAB using the mean(.) and cov(-) functions.
3. The Filter Knobs
The different parameters available in the Kalman filter for tuning will be
discussed in this section. The normal approach taken for state estimation in aircraft
application is to use a model developed from the aircraft's equations of motion. test
i to estimate the noise statistics then construct the filters and adjust them using
the data collected in the testing. Once these steps have been done the filters can be
evaluated to test their performance. If the designer is not satisfied with the results,
adjustments are done until satisfactory performance is obtained. This constitutes the
phase called "tuning of the Kalman filter".
Various parameters are changed during the tuning process. These param-
eters, sometimes called "filter knobs", are the process noise covariance Q(k), the
measurement noise covariance R(k), and the initial condition on P(O/O). From equa-
tion 2.31, it is apparent that for large Q(k), P(k + ilk) will also become large
indicating high uncertainties and an unreliable model. Conversely, if the values for
Q(k) are small, P(k + 1/k) will be small and the model will become adequate.
Another way to look at varying the knobs is to observe their effects on the
filter's transient response and the noise in the state estimates. As Q(k) increase so
will the gains and the system transient performance will be faster. However in this
case the noise in the state estimates will be larger. The same effect would occur if
R(k) would be smaller, but in many cases, the noise on the sensors is fixed. (See
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Table 4.2). The second possibility is to lower values for Q(k). This results iii lower
gains, and therefore in a slower filter transient performance. However. this would also
filter more noise from the estimates.
The initial values for P(O/O) also have an effect on the algorithm. ks
P(O/O) is set to large values, the initial gains will also become large and the initial
measurement will be heavily weighted compared to the model which will be considered
inadequate. It should be noted however that as more observations become available
the effects of the initial values of P(O/O) disappear. This effect is favorable as the
initial values for P(O/O) are seldom known. These results will occur only if the filter
is stable and the system is observable and controllable. [Ref. 161
C. PROBLEMS WITH THE PROBABILITY CALCULATIONS
A minimum value problem can arise when using equation 2.36. If the value
calculated for pi(k) is small the next value pi(k + 1) will only grow back slowly if it
has to. If pi(k) becomes zero, then the next values for pi(n) for n > k will also be set
to zero.
To avoid the problem of slow variation in the pi (k) calculation and the generation
of null values, the pi(k) are set to a minimum value if the calculations fall below a
certain level. The bound has been set to 10-4 for the application studied in this thesis.
This number can be changed easily in the MATLAB file pk.m under the variable name
"min" for any other value. However, this one seemed to work fairly well for the
Bluebird application and lies in the range recommended by Willsky [Ref. 7, p.2-5].
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D. PERFORMANCE OF THE MULTIPLE MODEL ALGORITHM IN
DIFFERENT ENVIRONMENTS
1. Non-Gaussian Noise
The Gaussian noise assumption is made in the formulation of equation 2.36
more specifically in the density function of equation 2.37. According to Willsky, [Ref.
7], even in the presence of non-Gaussian residuals. the performance of the algorithm
should not be influenced. That is, the algorithm is designed to measure how well
each of the Kalman filters is tracking by observing the residuals that are produced.
The probability calculations of equation 2.36 only measui, tnow well each filter is
estimating data relative to each other and how well they are expected to be tracking.
The important term in equation 2.37 is
rT(k) a-' (k) ri(k). (3.2)
In fact previous efforts have noted the leading coefficient before the exponential in
equation 2.37 provides little information in the identification of a failure [Ref. 141.
If the likelihood quotient that equation 3.2 represents is large, the ith model will be
non valid and if it is small, then the ith model is tracking well. This is reflected in
the calculation for the pi(k) and the Multiple Model algorithm will still produce the
expected results in the presence of non-Gaussian statistics.
2. Non-Linearities
The usual approach to non-linearities is to linearize the system around a
number of operating points that reflect the flight condition of the aircraft for each of
the models in the algorithm. These linearized models span the flight envelope and
can then be used to design extended Kalman filters which can replace the standard
Kalman filters in the Multiple Model algorithm. This has been done in this thesis
but around one operating point only. The A and B matrices were generated by Lt D.
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TABLE 3.1: NOMINAL CONDITIONS FOR THE BLUEBIRD
Turn rate 0.1 (rad/sec)
Ground speed S0 (ft/sec)
Rate of descent 300 (ft/min)
Hallberg USN in his present thesis work to design a controller for a nonlinear system.
such as the flight control system of the Bluebird . The plant was linearized around
the conditions in Table 3.1 and the numbers in the A and B matrices were generated
using the MATLAB function "linmod". The values are shown in APPENDIX C in
file ABCU-load.m. The C matrix is set as the identity.
The problem associated with the linearized approach is to determine whether
the tracking errors from the extended Kalman filters corresponding to the linearized
model are significantly smaller than the errors from filters based on more distant
models. In the nonlinear case, the inaccuracies of the Kalman filters increase the val-
ues of the internally generated residual covariance ai(k) in equation 2.29 and 2.28.
This has the effect of reducing the value of the probabilities pi(k) obtained through
equation 2.37. As the values for ai(k) increase it becomes more difficult to detect
errors.
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IV. SIMULATION AND RESULTS FOR THE
MULTIPLE MODEL FDI ALGORITHM
The procedure to simulate faults and test the Multiple Model FDI algorithm is
explained in APPENDIX A.
The simulation included trials to simulate hard failures in the actuators, hard
ailures in the sensors, soft failures in the actuators and soft failures in the sensors.
The results are shown in APPENDIX B. An input function was introduced in the
system in order to generate fluctuations in the sensors and drive the states to nonzero
values (see file kalmanV.i .m in APPENDIX C). If a state or sensor is at or close to
zero it is very difficult or impossible to detect a failure that is based on the hypothesis
that the sensor or actuator will go to zero when it fails.
The following paragraphs will introduce some of the data used to initialize the
algorithm prior to testing as well some discussion of the results.
A. SIMULATION PARAMETERS
As discussed in chapter 111. section B. 3., the value chosen for the process noise
will influence the behavior of the filters. The numbers employed in the simulation
are shown in Table 4.1 and can be changed in file ABCU~oad.m. These values
were selected to be as low as possible in order to have each of the separate filters
tuned to follow their respective model closely and to put little weight on the new
measurements. This is done to isolate the effect of a hard failures in each specific
filter.
It was found that in certain runs where the process noise values were too low, the
numbers generated by the Kalman filters in MATLAB would become unstable or out
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of range and the output of the probability computation were assigned to NaN (Not
a Number). NaN is produced in MATLAB when a division of either zero by zero or
infinity by infinity occurs. To fix this problem, numbers assigned for the process noise
were increased until the algorithm could function properly. Andrews and Grewal in
[Ref. 19, p.1 92 - 2 60] provide several interesting implementation methods for Kalman
filters where ill-conditioned problems arise. None of these special methods have been
tested in this thesis but they should be investigated if more accuracy is to be required
in future usage of this algorithm.
The values used for the measurement noise are those provided by the manu-
facturer of the sensor. These numbers are given in Table 4.2 and were obtained
from [Ref. 13, p. 60,61,71]. Samples of white noise were generated in MATLAB to
be represented by w and v in equations 2.11 and 2.12 and are shown in figure B.1
and B.2.
B. KALMAN FILTER TESTS
The Kalman filter developed for the algorithm was first tested using the plant
described in [Ref. 16, p. 127] and [Ref. 19, p. 143] and the error covariance matrices
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TABLE 4.2: MEASUREMENT NOISE VALUES










matched those in the referenced books. The covariance matrices for the simulation
runs are shown in Figures B.3 - B.11. All converge to small values as expected.
The gains for the bank of Kalman filters are shown in Figures B.12 -1 B.20.
The values for the gains converges to zero or close to it. This was expected since the
process noise numbers were chosen to be small in order to get small gains. This way
the filters would trust the model derived for their appropriate failure hypothesis.
The measurement state estimates or filtered measurements were plotted against
the noisy measurements in Figures B.21 - B.29 for the case of no failure. On all the
figures. the estimates from the Kalman filters follow the general curve or orientation
of the "true" measurements which was expected from the theory. The "'notch" seen
on some of the figures at the 1001h observation is caused by the step input function
that comes down at this point. The residuals or innovation processes are also shown
in Figures B.30 - B.38 and are used in the calculation of the probability of detecting
error in equation 2.36.
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C. DETECTION AND ISOLATION RESULTS
Menke and Maybeck in [Ref. 14. p. 3136] decided to set the detection threshold
for the different failure scenarios to a repetitive probability of 0.9 or higher for ten
consecutive observations in their application of FD!. This definition sets a minimum
that was well exceeded when testing this algorithm for the hard failure scheme. A set
of 13 hard failures were tested and some of the results are plotted in Figures B.39
- B.51. All of the data was not shown due to the large volume generated. Every
run for each failure generates 13 graphs of probability computation and only one of
those should show values close to one. The algorithm was quite good at detecting
abrupt failures in the system since all the probability plots show values reaching one
fairly soon and staying at that level until the end of all the observations. The plots
shown in Figures B.39 - B.51 represent only the particular output from the filter of
interest for the particular failure that they were supposed to be tuned to detect. The
otner plots from the filters tuned for other failures gave values of probability in the
vicinity of zero.
The test for no failure was also successful and the filter tuned for no failure
resulted in probability computation of one fairly early in the simulation as seen in
Figure B.52.
The results obtained during the soft or incipient failure runs were incoclusive
and the algorithm used in this detection scheme should not be considered yet as
operating satisfactorily. The probability computations were not consistent from one
run to another and several false alarms were generated, i.e., probabilities of 0.9 were
reached on filter channels not tuned to detect the error being tested. The plots in
Figures B.53 - B.55 were generated for the soft failure simulation on the elevator,
Figure B.53 shows that the failure was not detected. Figure B.54 and Figure B.55
show false alarm occurrences on the no failure filter and on the pitch rate filter.
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The same types of results were obtained when soft failure was tested for the





The results obtained were very encouraging for the detection of hard failures.
The filters were well tuned to detect failures under those particular situations. The
problematic results obtained when simulating soft failures were anticipated. These
difficulties have also been encountered by other researchers working in the field. More
work will be required to render this feature operational for the present FDI algorithm.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The Kalman gains should be precalculated and stored prior to being used since
they do not vary with measured data.
The work done in this thesis did not address the task of reconfiguration. If
the FDI algorithm is to be implemented on the Bluebird this part will need to be
addressed.
The whiteness tests described in chapter III. should also be conducted once
the algorithm is installed on the test bed since the noise experienced in the working
model might be quite different from that which what was generated numerically in
the MATLAB code.
A dual failure detection scheme could be implemented in future development in
order to detect several failures occurring at the same time.
The implementation methods from [Ref. 19, p.1 92 - 26 0] should be investigated
in order to improve the robustness of the algorithm when small numbers are generated
by the filter, thus eliminating ill-conditioned situations inside the algorithm.
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The algorithm implemented was tested on a model derived from the linearization
of a nonlinear system around one nominal flight condition. More tests should be
conducted using models linearized around several flight conditions.
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APPENDIX A: USER'S MANUAL
This appendix describes in detail the steps required to open and run the software
which generates the various probability charts to verify if failures have been detected.
The user must be familiar with the basic operation of the MATLAB software
package. Additionally, it is assumed that the user is already logged on to a NIATLAB
capable Unix work station. Before entering the MATLAB environment. one must
change the working directory to the one which contains all the '.m" files, in this case,
"marioth". The command is:
cd marioth
If the user is remotely logged onto a work station, he must set the DISPLAY environ-
ment variable appropriately in order to display graphics. The command which sets
this variable to intrepid, a Sparc 2 work station in the Avionics Lab is:
setenv DISPLAY intrepid.aa.nps.navy.mil:O
Now it is time to begin the MATLAB session by typing:
matlab
The next command to run the main program is:
fdi
A series of windows will appear for the user to select the type of failure to be
simulated. The user is required to position the arrow of the mouse on the pad of his
choice and click the left button of the mouse to select the item. The first window to
appear is for the selection of the type of failure to be simulated. The choices are:
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e no failure
* Hard or abrupt failure
* Soft or incipient failure
The second window to appear, if a selection other than "no failure" has been




The last window to appear will be to either select an actuator type or a sensor
type, depending on the choice made from the previous window. If the selection was
















Before running the program, the user might want to change some parameters
inside the program in order to save time or to look at more graphics.
The structure of the FDI program will now be presented in order to give the
user insight into how the algorithm works prior to changing the values inside the
different files. The structure of the algorithm is made of several MATLAB files and
functions.
The main file is called fdi.m and the majority of the calls to the different
functions are initiated within this file.
The first file to be accessed is ABCU-load.m. The values for the plant matrices
A,B,C.u are stored in this file along with the initial value for k(O/ - 1). P(k/k - 1)
and the values for the standard deviation of the process noise and measurement noise.
If many runs were to be conducted for different linearized models around operating
points, the plant matrices would be changed in this file. The values for the time
increment dt as well as the Stop time can be changed appropriately to vary the
total number of observations.
The second file accessed by fdi.m is the function faultchoice .m. This function
brings up the various pop-up menus and allows the user to simulate a certain fault
in the plant by zeroing the column or changing the noise on certain matrices. No
changes are required from the user to this file unless the structure of the program
needs to be changed.
The third step combines the calls to the function kalmn-gain.m in order to
calculate the gain for each of the Kalman filters associated with a particular fault.
Since the gains are independent of the measurement data, once the program has been
run once and the gains are stored in memory, the flag "need-to-calculate-gains"
can be set to "0" and some time will be saved for the future runs since the gains will
not be recalculated every time.
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The fourth step comprises the calls to the function kalman-i .m. This function
returus values for the residuals and the state estimates. Modifications to this file
can be made under the heading -measurements". where a step input of one second is
forced into the plant. The size of the step input is set to five degrees for the control
surfaces and to 50% for the thrust actuator. A call to the function kalman.plots
is located at the bottom of the file and can be enabled by removing the -%" at the
beginning of the line. The kalman-plots function generates plots for the process
noise, measurement noise, Kalman gains, error covariance matrices P(k/k). estimates
vs. noisy measurements, and plots for the residuals.
The "last call" of the main file is to the function pk.m. This function calculates
the hypothesis conditional probability pk as the probability that a measured param-
eter assumes the value at k conditioned on the observed measurement history up to
time k. It also generates the plots to show the probabilities of failure associated with
each sensor and actuator. No changes are required from the user to this file unless
the structure of the program needs to be changed.
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observation index (k)
Figure B.2: Measurement Noise v
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obeervaion kidex (k)
Figure B.3: Transpose Values of the Covariance Matrix P for State u
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obeemvason kxx ()
Figure B.4: Transpose Values of the Covariance Matrix P for State v
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o 20 4o 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
obswlou IneMx (k)
Figure B.5: Transpose Values of the Covariance Matrix P for State w
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observation hdx (k)
Figure B.6: Transpose Values of the Covariance Matrix P for State p
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% 20 40 w so Io 120 140 160 180 200
Figure B.7: Transpose Values of the Covariance Matrix P for State q
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Figure B.8: Transpose Values of the Covariance Matrix P for State r
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obeervtion Index (k)
Figure B.9: Transpose Values of the Covariance Matrix P for State phi
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obevation kde (k)
Figure B.11: Transpose Values of the Covariance Matrix P for State psi
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obeevauon kWx (k)
Figure B.12: Kalman Gains for the State u
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Figure B.13: Kalman Gains for the State v
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obewrvaton kidex (k)
Figure B. 4: Kalman Gains for the State w
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obmevaton Index (k)
Figure B.15: Kalman Gains for the State p
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obervubon WW= (k)
Figure B.16: Kalman Gains for the State q
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oservm#Abn knex (k)
Figure B.17: Kalman Gains for the State r
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Figure B.18: Kalman Gains for the State phi
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oburvatlon Index (k)
Figure B.19: Kalman Gains for the State theta
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obewvaton kne (k)
Figure B.20: Kalman Gains for the State psi
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Figure B.21: Measurement and State Estimate u







*10 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 18 20
observatlon Wadx (k)
Figure B.22: Measurement and State Estimate v
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Figure B.23: Measurement and State Estimate w
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Figure B.24: Measurement and State Estimate p
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Figure B.25: Measurement and State Estimate q
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Figure B.26: Measurement and State Estimate r
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Figure B.27: Measurement and State Estimate phi
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Figure B.28: Measurement and State Estimate theta
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Figure B.38: Innovation Process for the State psi
58










'o 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
obsrvahian wx (k)
Figure B.39: Probability of Elevator Hard Failure
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ol•ebaWon Mndex (k)
Figure B.40: Probability of Aileron Hard Failure
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obueivaon index (k)
Figure B.41: Probability of Rudder Hard Failure
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obswvaflon Wd (k)
Figure B.42: Probability of Thrust Actuator Hard Failure
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% 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
observation index (k)
Figure B.43: Probability of u Sensor Hard Failure
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observation index (k)
Figure B.44: Probability of v Sensor Hard Failure
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Figure B.45: Probability of w Sensor Hard Failure
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obesavaton Index (k)
Figure B.46: Probability of Roll Rate Sensor Hard Failure
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obMvilon index (k)
Figure B.47: Probability of Pitch Rate Sensor Hard Failure
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Figure B.48: Probability of Yaw Rate Sensor Hard Failure
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obsaewvaon Widex (k)
Figure B.49: Probability of Roll Angle Sensor Hard Failure
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Figure B.50: Probability of Angle of Attack Sensor Hard Failure
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obtervafon index (k)
Figure B.51: Probability of Heading Angle Hard Failure
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Figure B.52: Probability of No Failure
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osawato inmdex (k)
Figure B.53: Probability of Soft Failure on the Elevator Actuator
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obsrvadon index (k)
Figure B.54: Probability of Soft Failure on the Elevator Actuator
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osevaon nde (k)
Figure B.55: Probability of Soft Failure on the Elevator Actuator
Probalty of u. forward veoy hard aeior faiure
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obemation idex (k)
Figure B.56: Probability of Soft Failure on u sensor
67






0 20 40 6 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
obmefWaon index (k)
Figure B.57: Probability of Soft Failure on u sensor
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observation Index (k)
Figure B.58: Probability of Soft Failure on u sensor
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APPENDIX C: FDI PROGRAM LISTING
fdi.m
% Fault detection and isolation for the Bluebird test bed aircraft
% By: Capt M. Levesque
% Canadian Air Force
% Main file in thesis for the partial fulfillement of
% the requirement for the degree of MSEE
% This is the main file that call all the subroutines













Qm=zeros(rA,(rA*(kmax))); %covariance of process noise
Rm=zeros(rC,(rC*(kmax))); %covariance of measurment noise
wm=randn(rA,kmax); %randn(M,N) is an M by N matrix with random
vm=randn(rC,kmax); %entries normally distributed, mean 0.0 var 1.
%cov(X) is covariance matrix of X when each row is an observation and
%each column a variable
Qm=cov(wm'); %unweighted covariance matrix of the process/plant noise
Rm=cov(vm'); %unweighted covariance matrix of the measurement noise
[phidummy,GAMMAwm]=c2d(A,Wm,dt); %gives phi(k+l,k) and Gammaw(k)










%Kalman filter tuned for the system with elevator hard failure;
B2kf=B*diag([O 1 1 1]);
C2kf=C;
[G2,Pkk2,a2]=kalmn-gain(P_ init,Vik,Wik,A,B2kf,C2kf,dt,Stop_time);
%Kalman filter tuned for the system with aileron hard failure;
B3kf=B*diag([1 0 1 1]);
C3kf=C;
[G3,Pkk3,a3]=kalmn-gain(Pinit,Vik,Wik,A,B3kf,C3kf,dt,Stopt ime);
%Kalman filter tuned for the system with rudder hard failure;
B4kf=B*diag([1 1 0 1]);
C4kf=C;
[G4,Pkk4,a4]=kalmn-gain(Pinit,Vik,Wik,A,B4kf,C4kf,dt,Stop-time);
%Kalman filter tuned for the system with thrust actuator hard failure;




%,Kalman filter tuned for the system with u, forward velocity
hard failure;
B6kf-B;
C6kf=C*diag([O 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1]);
[G6,Pkk6,a6]=kalmn-gain(P_ init,Vik,Wik,A,B6kf,C6kf,dt,Stop_ttime);
%Kalman filter tuned for the system with v, lateral velocity
hard failure;
B7kf=B;
C7kf=C*diag([1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1]);
EG7,Pkk7,a7]=kalmn-gain(P_init ,Vik,Wik,A,B7kf,C7kf ,dt ,Stoptime);
%Kalman filter tuned for the system with w, vertical velocity
hard failure;
B8kf=B;
C8kf=C*diag([1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1]);
[G8,Pkk8,a8]=kalmn-gain(P-init,Vik,Wik,A,B8kf,C8kf,dt ,Stop-time);
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%Kalman filter tuned for the system with p, roll rate hard failure;
B9kf-B;
C9kf=C*diag([1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1]);
[G9,Pkk9,a9]=kalmn-gain(P-init,Vik,Wik,A,B9kf,C9kf,dt,Stop-time);
%Kalman filter tuned for the system with q, pitch rate hard failure;
BlOkf=B;
ClOkf=C*diag(El 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1]);
[GlO,PkklO,alO]=kalmn-gain(P-init,Vik,Wik,A,BlOkf,ClOkf,dt,Stoptime);
%Kalman filter tuned for the system with r, yaw rate hard failure;
Bllkf=B;
Cllkf=C*diag([l 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1]);
[Gll,Pkkll,all]=kalmn-gain(P-init,Vik,Wik,A,Bllkf,Cllkf,dt,Stop-time);
%Kalman filter tuned for the system with phi, roll sensor hard failure;
B12kf=B;
Cl2kf=C*diag([l 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 I]);
[G12,Pkkl2,al2]=kalmn-gain(P-init,Vik,Wik,A,Bl2kfCl2kf,dt,Stop-time);
%Kalman filter tuned for tle system with theta, angle of attack sensor
hard failure;
Bl3kf=B;
C13kf=C*diag([l 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1]);
[G13,Pkkl3,a13]=kalmn-gain(P-init,Vik,Wik,A,B13kf,C13kf,dt,Stoptime);
%Kalman filter tuned for the system with psi, heading sensor
hard failure;
Bl4kf=B;
C14kf=C*diag([1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0]);
[G14,Pkkl4,a14]=kalmngain(Pinit,Vik,Wik,A,B14kf,C14kf,dt,Stoptime);
end; %for if need-to-calculate.gains
%Calls to kalman filter function to calculate residue and state
estimates
%the nominal system








%.Kalman filter tuned for the system with aileron hard failure;
[res3,xhat3]=kalman_ i(G3,Pkk3,xk_init,GAMMAwm,Vm,wm,vm,A,Bm,Cm,u,B3kf,
C3kf ,dt ,Stoptime);
%Kalman filter tuned for the system with rudder hard failure;
[res4,xhat4]=kalman_ i(G4,Pkk4,xk_.init,GAMMAwm,Vm,wm,vm,A,Bm,Cm,u,B4kf,
C4kf ,dt,Stop.time);
















%Kalman filter tuned for the system with p, roll rate hard failure;
[res9,xhat9]=kalmani(G9,Pkk9,xk_ init,GAMMAwm,Vm,wm,vm,A,Bm,Cm,u,B9kf,
C9kf ,dt ,Stoptime);
%Kalman filter tuned for the system with q, pitch rate hard failure;
[resiO,xhati0]=kalman_ i(GlO,PkklO,xk-init,GAMMAwm,Vm,wm,vm,A,Bm,Cm,u,
BlOkf,ClOkf ,dt,Stop-time);
%Kalman filter tuned for the system with r, yaw rate hard failure;
[resl1,xhatll]=kalman_ i(Gll,Pkkll,xk-init,GAMMAwm,Vm,wm,vm,A,Bm,Cm,u,
Bllkf,Cllkf,dt,Stop-time);
%Kalman filter tuned for the system with phi, roll sensor hard failure;
[resl2,xhatl2]=kalman_i(Gl2,Pkkl2,xk-init,GAMMAwm,Vm,wm,vm,A,Bm,Cm,u,
B12kf,C12kf ,dt ,Stop.time);









%Soft or incipient failure






%this m file is executed at the beginning of the fdi main file to load
%the memory with the following initial conditions
Stop_ttime=2;
dt=O.0l;


























Ymodel simulation using numbers from Dave Kuechenmeister's thesis
A=[-0.0635 0 0.3277 0 -1.4922 0 0 -32.1740 0
0 -0.3911 0 1.6086 0 -72.6109 32.1740 0 0
-0.7572 0 -4.7741 0 67.9934 0 -0.0002 -0.0002 0
0 -0.1471 0 -5.4414 0 1.5183 0 0 0
0.0151 0 -0.1933 0 -3.1672 0 0 0 0
0 0.1440 0 -1.0578 0 -0.8114 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0];
B-E -4.5835 0 0 8.7745
74
0 5.8282 0 0
-38.8681 0 0 0
0 0.6252 47.1717 0
-22.0417 0 0 0
0 -7.3151 -6.4345 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0



















sqrt(O.001) sqrt(O.001) sqrt(O.001)]'; %Ww=[sigma .... ]
Vikf[sqrt(10) sqrt(1) sqrt(1) sqrt(O.057) sqrt(O.057) sqrt(O.057),...
sqrt(O.2*pi/180) sqrt(0.2*pi/180) sqrt(3*pi/180)]';
incipient-fault-noisefactor=5;
%model simulation using numbers from Eric Hallberg's thesis
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
A=[-0.0825 0.1193 0.0467 0.0011 1.3303 3.4789 0.0027 -32.0613 0
-0.1020 -0.4281 -0.0059 -1.4341 0 -80.7651 30.8814 0.7255 0
-0.8561 -0.0427 -5.2818 -3.4481 75.6252 0.0006 -8.4582 2.5534 0
0.0048 -0.1583 0.0149 -6.0885 0.3198 1.6817 -0.0074 0.0022 0
0.0069 -0.0039 -0.2155 -0.1305 -3.5224 0.0441 0.1064 -0.0321 0
-0.0061 0.1680 -0.0002 -0.8975 -0.0086 -0.9863 0.0002 0 0
0 0 0 1.0000 -0.0226 -0.0811 -0.0001 0.0971 0
0 0 0 0 0.9632 -0.2687 -0.0965 0 0
0 0 0 0 0.2696 0.9666 0.0016 -0.0082 0];
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B=E-7.5739 0 -0.3370 8.7745
-0.2898 0 7.2176 0
-47.9100 0 -1.4904 0
1.8944 58.1206 0.4870 0
-27.2996 1.5561 0.0352 0
-0.0418 -10.8643 -9.0965 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0


















Wik=[l*vf 0.5*wf 0.5*wf 0.057*wf 0.057*wf 0.4*vf 0.3*pi/180*wf
0.3*pi/180*wf 1*pi/180*wf] 3;






% This function modifies the values of the matrices A, B, C, or u
% according to the type of failure selected from the user.
%choice of failure to be simulated%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Failure-type-menu('Choose a fault scenario to test the FDI algorithm',
'no failure',
'Hard or abrupt failure',
'Soft or incipient failure');
if Failure-type -= 1
Failure-source-menu('Choose a failure source',
'Actuator Failure',
'Sensor Failure');
if Failure-source == 1






elseif Failure-source == 2























%Hard or abrupt failures
%%%%%%XX%%%%%%%%%%%%XX 
elseif Failure-type == 2




if Actuator-type == 1 %elevator hard failure
Bm=B*diag([O 1 1 1]);
elseif Actuator-type == 2 %aileron hard failure
Bm=B*diag([l 0 1 1]);
elseif Actuator-type == 3 %rudder hard failure
Bm=B*diag([1 1 0 1]);
elseif Actuator-type == 4 %Thrust actuator hard failure
Bm=B*diag([1 1 1 0]);
end;




if Sensor-type == 1 %u, forward velocity hard failure
Cm=C*diag([O 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1]);
elseif Sensor-type == 2 %v, lateral velocity hard failure
Cm=C*diag([l 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1]);
elseif Sensor-type == 3 %w, vertical velocity hard failure
Cm=C*diag([1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1]);
elseif Sensor-type == 4 %p, roll rate hard failure
Cm=C*diag([l 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1]);
elseif Sensor-type == 5 %q, pitch rate hard failure
Cm=C*diag([l 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1]);
elseif Sensor-type == 6 %r, yaw rate hard failure
Cm=C*diag([1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1]);
elseif Sensor-type == 7 %phi, roll sensor hard failure
Cm=C*diag([1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1]);
elseif Sensor.type == 8Xtheta, angle of attack sensor hard failure
Cm=C*diag([1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1]);
elseif Sensor-type == 9 %psi, heading sensor hard failure
Cm=C*diag([l 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0]);
end;
end;
%Soft or incipient failure
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%7
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elseif Failure-type - 3
nf=incipient-fault.noise-factor;





if Actuator-type == 1 %elevator hard failure
Bm-B*diag([nf 1 1 1]);
elseif Actuator-type == 2 %aileron hard failure
Bm=B*diag([l nf 1 1]);
elseif Actuator-type == 3 %rudder hard failure
Bm=B*diag([1 1 nf 1]);
elseif Actuatortype == 4 %Thrust actuator hard failure
Bm=B*diag([l 1 1 nf]);
end;




if Sensor-type == 1 %u, forward velocity hard failure
Vm=diag([nf 1 1 1 1 1 11 1])*Vik;
elseif Sensor-type == 2 %v, lateral velocity hard failure
Vm=diag([1 nf 1 1 1 1 1 1 I1])*Vik;
elseif Sensor-type == 3 Zw, vertical velocity hard failure
Vm=diag([l 1 nf 1 1 1 1 1 1])*Vik;
elseif Sensor-type == 4 %p, roll rate hard failure
Vm=diag([l 1 1 nf 1 1 1 1 1])*Vik;
elseif Sensor-type == 5 %q, pitch rate hard failure
Vm=diag([l 1 1 1 nf 1 1 1 1])*Vik;
elseif Sensor-type == 6 'r, yaw rate hard failure
Vm=diag([l 1 1 1 1 nf 1 1 1])*Vik;
elseif Sensor-type == 7 %phi, roll sensor hard failure
Vm=diag([l 1 1 1 1 1 nf 1 1])*Vik;
elseif Sensor-type ==8%theta, angle of attack sensor hard failure
Vm=diag([l 1 1 1 1 1 1 nf 1])*Vik;
elseif Sensor-type == 9 %psi, heading sensor hard failure














Pkk=zeros(rA,(rA*(kmax))); %P(k/k) covariance of estimation
%error matrix
G=zeros(rA,(rC*(kmax))); %Kalman Gains
a=zeros(rC,(rC*(kmax))); %hypothesized filter's internally
%computed residual covariance
%noise generation
Qikzeros(rA,(rA*(kmax))); %covariance of process noise
Rik=zeros(rC,(rC*(kmax))); %covariance of measurment noise
w=randn(rA,kmax); %randn(M,N) is an M by N matrix with random
v=randn(rC,kmax); %entries normally distributed, mean 0.0 var 1.
%cov(X) is covariance matrix of X when each row is an observation and
%each column a variable
Qik=cov(w'); %unweighted covariance matrix of the process/plant noise
Rik=cov(v'); %unweighted covariance matrix of the measurement noise
[phidummy,GAMMAik]=c2d(A,Wik,dt); %gives phi(k+l,k) and Gammaw(k)
% KALMAN FILTER CALCULATION
[phi-ikf,del-ikf]=c2d(A,Bikf,dt); %gives phi(k+l,k) and del(k)
% Offline calculations, generation of gain schedule
% (The Gains do not depend on measurement data)
%%%%%%%%A%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
for i=l:kmax






%hypothesized filter's internally computed residual covariance used
in G
a(:,(i*rC-(rC-1):i*rC)) =




Pkkml(:,(i*rA-(rA-1):i*rA)) * Cikf' *.
inv( a(:,(i*rC-(rC-1):i*rC)) );
%P(k/k), covariance of estimation error matrix
Pkk(:,(i*rA-(rA-1):i*rA)) = (eye(rA) -
G(:,(i*rC-(rC-1):i*rC)) * Cikf) *
Pkkml(:,(i*rA-(rA-1):i*rA));
%discrete Lyapunov equation
%update the estimation error covariance matrix, new Pkkml or P(k+1/k)
Pkkml(:,((i+l)*rA-(rA-1):(i+l)*rA)) = phi-ikf *














%This function calculates the residuals and the state estimates of
%a system using a kalman filter tuned according to the input values
%in above bracket.














xhatkk=zeros(rA,kmax); %xhat(k/k) state estimates
xhatkkml=zeros(rA,kmax+l); %xhat(k/k-1) state estimate a-priori
yhatk=zeros(rC,kmax); %measurement estimates
residualk=zeros(rC,kmax); %residual is y - yhat
% KALMAN FILTER CALCULATION%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% measurements%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
[phi,del]=c2d(A,Bm,dt); %gives phi(k+l,k) and del(k)
uinit=u;
for i=l:kmax,











xk(:,i+l) = phi * xk(:,i) + del * u + diag(GAMMAwm) *wm(:,i);
yk(:,i) = Cm * xk(:,i) + diag(Vm) * vm(:,i);
end;
% Online calculations, generation of estimates%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%•%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
[phi-ikf,del-ikf]=c2d(A,Bikf,dt); %gives phi(k+l,k) and del(k)
for i=l:kmax














%innovation process, error in the measurement and estimate
residualk(:,i) = yk(:,i)-yhatk(:,i);
%state estimate













%This function is used to generate plots from the values calculated
%in the function kalman-i.



















ylabel('white noise (mean=O, variance=l)')
pause
end;


































































%This function calculates the hypothesis conditional probability pk
%as the probability that a measured parameter assumes the value at k


















Scase for k=1 to have a value for p(t-1), index can not equal zero!%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
k=1;


























































pkl (k) =fzkl (k) *pkl-kml/...
(fzk2(k)*pk2_kml + fzk3(k)*pk3_kml + fzk4(k)*pk4_kml + fzk5(k)*pk5_kml
fzk6(k)*pk6_kml + fzk7(k)*pk7-kml + fzk8(k)*pk8_kml + fzk9(k)*pk9_kml
fzklO(k)*pklO-kml + fzkll(k)*pkll1kml + fzkl2(k)*pkl2_kml +
fzkl3(k)*pkl3_kmi + fzkl4(k)*pki4-kml + fzkl(k)*pkl-kml);
if pkl(k)<min, pkl(k)=min; end;
pk2(k)=fzk2(k)*pk2_kmi/...
(fzkl(k)*pkl.kml + fzk3(k)*pk3_kml + fzk4(k)*pk4_kml + fzk5(k)*pk5_kml
fzk6(k)*pk6_kml + fzk7(k)*pk7Tkml + fzk8(k)*pk8_kml + fzk9(k)*pk9gkml
"4 + ..
fzklO(k)*pklOjkml + fzkll(k)*pklljkml + fzk12(k)*pk2_kml +.fzkl3(k)*pkl3_.kml + fzkl4(k)*pkl4..kml + fzk2(k)*pk2_kml);
if pk2(k)<min, pk2(k)=min; end;
pk3 (k) =fzk3 (k)*pk3_kmi/...
(fzkl(k)*pkljkml + fzk2(k)*pk2_kml + fzk4(k)*pk4_kml + fzk5(k)*pk5-kml
fzk6(k)*pk6_kml + fzk7(k)*pk7-kml + fzk8(k)*pk8_kml + fzk9(k)*pk9-kml
fzklO(k)*pklO.kml + fzkll(k)*pkll-kml + fzkl2(k)*pkl2_kml + ...
fzkl3(k)*pkl3_kml + fzkl4(k)*pkl4_kml + fzk3(k)*pk3_kml);
if pk3(k)<min, pk3(k)=min; end;
pk4 (k) =fzk4 (k) *pk4_kml/...
(fzkl(k)*pkl.kml + fzk2(k)*pk2_kmi + fzk3(k)*pk3_kml + fzk5(k)*pk5-kml
fzk6(k)*pk6_kml + fzk7(k)*pk7-kml + fzk8(k)*pk8.kml + fzk9(k)*pk9_kml
fzklO(k)*pklO-kml + fzkll(k)*pkll-kml + fzkl2(k)*pkl2_kml + ...
fzkl3(k)*pkl3-kml + fzkl4(k)*pkl4_kml + fzk4(k)*pk4_kml);
if pk4(k)<min, pk4(k)=min; end;
pk5 (k) =fzk5 (k) *pk5_kml/...
(fzkl(k)*pkl-kml + fzk2(k)*pk2_kml + fzk3(k)*pk3_kml + fzk4(k)*pk4_kml
fzk6(k)*pk6_kml + fzk7(k)*pk7Tkml + fzk8(k)*pk8_kml + fzk9(k)*pk9_kml
fzklO(k)*pklO-kml + fzkll(k)*pkllckml + fzkl2(k)*pkl2_kml + ...
fzkl3(k)*pkl3_kml + fzkl4(k)*pkl4_kml + fzk5(k)*pk5_kml);
90
if pk5(k)<min, pkS(k)=min; end;
pk6(k)=fzk6(k)*pk6_kml/...
(fzkl(k)*pkl-kml + fzk2(k)*pk2_kml + fzk3(k)*pk3_kml + fzk4(k)*pk4_kml
fzk5(k)*pk5_kml + fzk7(k)*pk7_kml + fzk8(k)*pk8_kml + fzk9(k)*pk9_kml
fzklO(k)*pklO-kml + fzkll(k)*pkll-kml + fzkl2(k)*pkl2_kml + ...
fzkl3(k)*pkl3_kml + fzkl4(k)*pkl4_kml + fzk6(k)*pk6_kml);
if pk6(k)<min, pk6(k)=min; end;
pk7(k)=fzk7(k)*pk7_kml/...
(fzkl(k)*pkl-kml + fzk2(k)*pk2_kml + fzk3(k)*pk3_kml + fzk4(k)*pk4_kml
fzk5(k)*pk5_kml + fzk6(k)*pk6_kml + fzk8(k)*pk8_kml + fzk9(k)*pk9_kml
fzklO(k)*pklO-kml + fzkll(k)*pkll-kml + fzkl2(k)*pkl2_kml +
fzkl3(k)*pkl3_kml + fzkl4(k)*pkl4-kml + fzk7(k)*pk7-kml);
if pk7(k)<min, pk7(k)=min; end;
pk8(k)=fzk8(k)*pk8_kml/...
(fzki(k)*pklkmi + fzk2(k)*pk2_kml + fzk3(k)*pk3_kml + fzk4(k)*pk4_kml
fzk5(k)*pksjkml + fzk6(k)*pk6_kml + fzk7(k)*pk7_kml + fzk9(k)*pk9_kml
fzklO(k)*pklOkml + fzk11(k)*pk11kml + fzkl2(k)*pkl2_kml + ...
fzkl3(k)*pkl3_kml + fzkl4(k)*pkl4-kml + fzk8(k)*pk8_kml);
if pk8(k)<min, pk8(k)=min; end;
pk9(k)=fzk9(k)*pk9_kml/...
(fzkl(k)*pkl-kml + fzk2(k)*pk2_kml + fzk3(k)*pk3_kml + fzk4(k)*pk4_kml
fzk5(k)*pk5_kml + fzk6(k)*pk6_kml + fzk7(k)*pk7Tkml + fzk8(k)*pk8_kml
fzklO(k)*pklOjkml + fzkll(k)*pkll-kml + fzkl2(k)*pkl2_kml +
fzkl3(k)*pkl3_kml + fzkl4(k)*pkl4_kml + fzk9(k)*pk9_kml);
if pk9(k)<min, pk9(k)=min; end;
pklO(k)=fzklO(k)*pklO-kml/...
(fzkl(k)*pkl-kml + fzk2(k)*pk2_kml + fzk3(k)*pk3_kml + fzk4(k)*pk4_kml
fzk5(k)*pk5.kml + fzk6(k)*pk6_kml + fzk7(k)*pk7_kml + fzk8(k)*pk8.kml
fzk9(k)*pk9-kml + fzkll(k)*pkllkml + fzkl2(k)*pkl2_kml +
fzkl3(k)*pkl3_kml + fzkl4(k)*pkl4_kml + fzklO(k)*pklOkml);
if pklO(k)<min, pklO(k)=min; end;
pkll(k)=fzkll(k)*pkll-kml/...
(fzkl(k)*pkl-kml + fzk2(k)*pk2_kml + fzk3(k)*pk3_kml + fzk4(k)*pk4_kml
fzk5(k)*pk5_kml + fzk6(k)*pk6_kml + fzk7(k)*pk7_kml + fzk8(k)*pk8_kml
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fzk9(k)*pk9_kml + fzklO(k)*pklOjcml + fzk12(k)*pkl2_kml +
fzkl3(k)*pkl3_kml + fzkl4(k)*pkl4_kml + fzkll(k)*pklljkml);
if pkil(k)<min, pkll(k)=min; end;
pkl2(k)=fzkl2(k)*pkl2_kml/...
(fzkl(k)*pklkml + fzk2(k)*pk2_kml + fzk3(k)*pk3_kml + fzk4(k)*pk4_kml
fzk5(k)*pk5_kml + fzk6(k)*pk6_kml + fzk7(k)*pk7jkml + fzk8(k)*pk8_kml
fzk9(k)*pk9gkml + fzklO(k)*pklO-kml + fzkll(k)*pkll-kml +
fzkl3(k)*pkl3_kml + fzkl4(k)*pkl4_kml + fzk12(k)*pk12_kml);
if pkl2(k)<min, pkl2(k)=min; end;
pkl3(k)=fzkl3(k)*pkl3_kml/...
(fzkl(k)*pkl-kml + fzk2(k)*pk2_kml + fzk3(k)*pk3_kml + fzk4(k)*pk4_kml
fzk5(k)*pk5_kml + fzk6(k)*pk6_kml + fzk7(k)*pk7_kml + fzk8(k)*pk8-kml
fzk9(k)*pk9_kml + fzklO(k)*pklO-kml + fzkll(k)*pk11_kml +
fzkl2(k)*pkl2_kml + fzkl4(k)*pkl4_kml + fzkl3(k)*pkl3_kml);
if pkl3(k)<min, pkl3(k)=min; end;
pkl4(k)=fzkl4(k)*pkl4_kml/...
(fzkl(k)*pkl-kml + fzk2(k)*pk2_kml + fzk3(k)*pk3_kml + fzk4(k)*pk4jkml
fzk5(k)*pk5-kml + fzk6(k)*pk6_kml + fzk7(k)*pk7_kml + fzk8(k)*pk8_kml
fzk9(k)*pk9-kml + fzklO(k)*pklO-kml + fzkll(k)*pkll-kml +
fzkl2(k)*pkl2_kml + fzkl3(k)*pkl3-kml + fzkl4(k)*pkl4_kml);
if pkl4(k)<min, pkl4(k)=min; end;
%calculation for the rest of the samples%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
for k = 2:kmax













fzk4(k) = 1 / ((2*pi)-(ra*(1/2))*det(a4(:,(k*ra-(ra-1):k*ra)))
"-0.5) * . .
exp(-O.5*res4(:,k)'*inv(a4(:,(k*ra-(ra-1):k*ra))) *
res4(:,k) );










































(fzk2(k)*pk2(k-1) + fzk3(k)*pk3(k-1) + fzk4(k)*pk4(k-1) + fzk5(k)*
pk5(k-1) + ...
fzk6(k)*pk6(k-1) + fzkl(k)*pk7(k-1) + fzk8(k)*pk8(k-1) + fzk9(k)*
pk9(k-1) +
fzklO(k)*pklO(k-1) + fzkil(k)*pkii(k-1) + fzkl2(k)*pkl2(k-1) + ...
fzkl3(k)*pkl3(k-1) + fzkl4(k)*pkl4(k-1) + fzkl(k)*pkl(k-1));
if pkl(k)<min, pkl(k)=min; end;
pk2(k)=fzk2(k)*pk2(k-l)/...
(fzkl(k)*pkl(k-1) + fzk3(k)*pk3(k-1) + fzk4(k)*pk4(k-1) + fzk5(k)*
pk5(k-1) +
fzk6(k)*pk6(k-1) + fzk7(k)*pk7(k-1) + fzk8(k)*pk8(k-1) + fzk9(k)*
pk9(k-1) + ...
fzklO(k)*pkIO(k-1) + fzkil(k)*pkil(k-i) + fzk12(k)*pki2(k-i) + ...
fzkl3(k)*pkl3(k-i) + fzkl4(k)*pkl4(k-1) + fzk2(k)*pk2(k-1));
if pk2(k)<min, pk2(k)=min; end;
pk3(k)=fzk3(k)*pk3(k-l)/...
(fzkl(k)*pkl(k-i) + fzk2(k)*pk2(k-1) + fzk4(k)*pk4(k-1) + fzk5(k)*
pk5(k-1) + ...
fzk6(k)*pk6(k-i) + fzk7(k)*pk7(k-i) + fzk8(k)*pk8(k-1) + fzk9(k)*
pk9(k-1) + ...
fzklO(k)*pklO(k-i) + fzkll(k)*pkll(k-i) + fzkl2(k)*pkl2(k-1) +
fzki3(k)*pkl3(k-1) + fzkl4(k)*pkl4(k-i) + fzk3(k)*pk3(k-1));
if pk3(k)<min, pk3(k)=min; end;
pk4(k)=fzk4(k)*pk4(k-l)/...
(fzkl(k)*pki(k-1) + fzk2(k)*pk2(k-1) + fzk3(k)*pk3(k-i) + fzk5(k)*
pk5(k-i) + ...
fzk6(k)*pk6(k-i) + fzk7(k)*pk7(k-i) + fzk8(k)*pk8(k-1) + fzk9(k)*
pk9(k-i) + ...
fzklO(k)*pklO(k-1) + fzkll(k)*pkll(k-1) + fzkl2(k)*pkl2(k-1) +
fzkl3(k)*pki3(k-1) + fzkl4(k)*pkl4(k-1) + fzk4(k)*pk4(k-1));
if pk4(k)<min, pk4(k)=min; end;
pk5(k)=fzk5(k)*pk5(k-l)/...
(fzkl(k)*pkl(k-i) + fzk2(k)*pk2(k-i) + fzk3(k)*pk3(k-i) + fzk4(k)*
pk4(k-i) + ...
fzk6(k)*pk6(k-1) + fzk7(k)*pk7(k-1) + fzk8(k)*pk8(k-1) + fzk9(k)*
pk9(k-1) + ...
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fzklO(k)*pklO(k-1) + fzkll(k)*pkil(k-1) + fzkl2(k)*pk12(k-1) + ..
fzk13(k)*pk13(k-1) + fzk14(k)*pk14(k-1) + fzk5(k)*pk5(k-1));
if pkS(k)<min, pk5(k)=min; end;
pk6(k)=fzk6(k)*pk6(k-) I...
(fzkl(k)*pkl(k-1) , fzk2(k)*pk2(k-1) + fzk3(k)*pk3(k-1) + fzk4(k)*
pk4(k-1) + ...
fzk5(k)*DkS(k-1) + fzk7(k)*pk7(k-i) + fzk8(k)*pk8(k-i) + fzk9(k)*
pk9(k-1) +
fzlrlOkk)*pkIO(k-1) + fzkll(k)*pkll(k-1) + fzkl2(k)*pkl2(k-1) + .
fzk13(k)*pkl3(k-1) + fzkl4(k)*pkl4(k-i) + fzk6(k)*pk6(k-1));
if pk6(k)<min, pk6(k)=min; end;
pk7(k)=fzk7(k)*pk7(k-i)/...
(fzkl(k)*pkl(k-1) + fzk2(k)*pk2(k-1) + fzk3(k)*pk3(k-1) + fzk4(k)*
pk4(k-i) + ...
fzk5(k)*pk5(k-i) + fzk6(k)*pk6(k-1) + fzk8(k)*pk8(k-1) + fzk9(k)*
pk9(k-i) + ...
fzklO(k)*pklO(k-i) + fzk1l(k)*pkll(k-1) + fzkl2(k)*pkl2(k-1) + ..
fzkl3(k)*pkl3(k-1) + fzkl4(k)*pkl4(k-i) + fzk7(k)*pk7(k-1));
if pk7(k)<min, pk7(k)=min; end;
pk8(k)=fzk8(k)*pk8(k-l)/...
(fzkl(k)*pkl(k-i) + fzk2(k)*pk2(k-i) + fzk3(k)*pk3(k-i) + fzk4(k)*
pk4(k-i) + ...
fzkS(k)*pk5(k-i) + fzk6(k)*pk6(k-1) + fzk7(k)*pk7(k-1) + fzk9(k)*
pk9(k-i) + ...
fzkiO(k)*pklO(k-1) + fzkii(k)*pkll(k-1) + fzkl2(k)*pkl2(k-i) + ..
fzkl3(k)*pkl3(k-i) + fzkl4(k)*pkl4(k-i) + fzk8(k)*pk8(k-i));
if pk8(k)<min, pk8(k)=min; end;
pk9(k)=fzk9(k)*pk9(k-l)/...
(fzkl(k)*pkl(k-1) + fzk2(k)*pk2(k-1) + fzk3(k)*pk3(k-1) + fzk4(k)*
pk4(k-1) + ...
fzk5(k)*pk5(k-i) + fzk6(k)*pk6(k-1) + fzk7(k)*pk7(k-i) + fzk8(k)*
pk8(k-i) + ...
fzklO(k)*pklO(k-1) + fzkll(k)*pkll(k-1) + fzkl2(k)*pkl2(k-1) +
fzki3(k)*pk13(k-1) + fzki4(k)*pk14(k-1) + fzk9(k)*pk9(k-1));
if pk9(k)<min, pk9(k)=min; end;
pklO(k)=fzklO(k)*pkiO(k-l)/...
(fzkl(k)*pkl(k-i) + fzk2(k)*pk2(k-i) + fzk3(k)*pk3(k-1) + fzk4(k)*
pk4(k-i) +
fzk5(k)*pk5(k-i) + fzk6(k)*pk6(k-i) + fzk7(k)*pk7(k-1) + fzk8(k)*
pk8(k-i) + ...
fzk9(k)*pk9(k-1) + fzk11(k)*pkii(k-1) + fzk12(k)*pkl2(k-1) + ..
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fzkl3(k)*pkl3(k-1) + fzkl4(k)*pkl4(k-I) + fzklO(k)*pklO(k-1));
if pklO(k)<min, pklO(k)=min; end;
pkll(k)=fzkll(k)*pkll(k-1)/...
(fzkl(k)*pkl(k-1) + fzk2(k)*pk2(k-1) + fzk3(k)*pk3(k-1) + fzk4(k)*
pk4(k-1) +
fzk5(k)*pk5(k-1) + fzk6(k)*pk6(k-1) + fzk7(k)*pk7(k-1) + fzk8(k)*
pk8(k-1) +
fzk9(k)*pk9(k-1) + fzklO(k)*pklO(k-1) + fzkl2(k)*pkl2(k-1) +
fzkl3(k)*pkl3(k-1) + fzkl4(k)*pkl4(k-1) + fzkll(k)*pkll(k-1));
if pkll(k)<min, pkll(k)=min; end;
pkl2(k)=fzkl2(k)*pkl2(k-l)/...
(fzkl.(k)*pkl(k-1) + fzk2(k)*pk2(k-1) + fzk3(k)*pk3(k-1) + fzk4(k)*
pk4(k-1) + ...
fzk5(k)*pk5(k-1) + fzk6(k)*pk6(k-1) + fzk7(k)*pk7(k-1) + fzk8(k)*
pk8(k-1) +
fzk9(k)*pk9(k-1) + fzklO(k)*pklO(k-1) + fzkll(k)*pkll(k-1) +
fzkl3(k)*pkl3(k-1) + fzkl4(k)*pkl4(k-1) + fzkl2(k)*pkl2(k-1));
if pkl2(k)<min, pkl2(k)=min; end;
pkl3(k)=fzkl3(k)*pkl3(k-l)/...
(fzkl(k)*pkl(k-1) + fzk2(k)*pk2(k-1) + fzk3(k)*pk3(k-1) + fzk4(k)*
pk4(k-1) + ...
fzk5(k)*pk5(k-1) + fzk6(k)*pk6(k-1) + fzk7(k)*pk7(k-1) + fzk8(k)*
pk8(k-1) + ...
fzk9(k)*pk9(k-1) + fzklO(k)*pklO(k-1) + fzkll(k)*pkll(k-1) +
fzkl2(k)*pkl2(k-1) + fzkl4(k)*pkl4(k-1) + fzkl3(k)*pkl3(k-1));
if pkl3(k)<min, pkl3(k)=min; end;
pkl4(k)=fzkl4(k)*pk14(k-l)/...
(fzkl(k)*pkl(k-1) + fzk2(k)*pk2(k-1) + fzk3(k)*pk3(k-1) + fzk4(k)*
pk4(k-1) + ...
fzk5(k)*pk5(k-1) + fzk6(k)*pk6(k-1) + fzk7(k)*pk7(k-1) + fzk8(k)*
pk8(k-1) + ...
fzk9(k)*pk9(k-1) + fzklO(k)*pklO(k-1) + fzkll(k)*pkll(k-1) + ...
fzkl2(k)*pkl2(k-1) + fzkl3(k)*pkl3(k-1) + fzkl4(k)*pkl4(k-1));
if pkl4(k)<min, pkl4(k)=min; end;
end; % index k
plot(l:k,pkl)
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